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THE MCDONNELL CASE: A CLARIFICATION OF
CORRUPTION LAW OR A CONFUSING APPLICATION
OF CORRUPTION LAW
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 2014, Governor Robert F. McDonnell and his
wife, Maureen G. McDonnell, were convicted in federal court of
various crimes related to their relationship with Jonnie Williams,
a Virginia businessman, and his company Star Scientific.' Earlier
in the year, the McDonnells were charged in a fourteen-count in-
dictment primarily consisting of public corruption charges. Gov-
ernor McDonnell faced one count of conspiracy to commit honest-
services wire fraud, three counts of honest-services wire fraud,
one count of conspiracy to obtain property under color of official
right, six counts of obtaining property under color of official right,
and two counts of providing false statements, one on a financial
statement and one on a loan application.' Governor McDonnell
was convicted on all counts except the two false statement charg-
es.' Mrs. McDonnell faced the same charges as Governor McDon-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author thanks Kelsey Martin for
her research assistance.
1. Verdict, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No.
3:14cr12-JRS), 2014 WL 4383056; see Rosalind S. Helderman & Matt Zapotosky, Ex-Va.
Governor Robert McDonnell Guilty of 11 Counts of Corruption, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/virginia-politics/mcdonnell-jury-in-third-day-of-del
iberations201409/04/0e0lff88-3435-1le4-9e92-0899b306bbeastory.html.
2. Indictment 108-23, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va.
2014) (No. 3:14cr12), 2014 WML 223601.
3. Id. Conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1349
(2012). Honest-services wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (defining scheme to defraud under the mail and wire fraud statutes to include a
scheme "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services"). Conspiracy to ob-
tain property under color of official rights and obtaining property under color of official
right, also known as Hobbs Act violations, are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). The
false statements statute at issue is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).
4. Verdict, supra note 1.
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nell, except she faced only one of the two false statement charges
and was also charged with obstructing an official proceeding.5
Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest-
services fraud, two counts of committing honest-services fraud,
conspiracy to obtain property under color of official right, four
counts of obtaining property under color of official right, and ob-
struction of an official proceeding.6 She was acquitted of one count
of honest-services wire fraud, two counts of obtaining property
under color of official right, and the only false statement count
with which she was charged The trial judge, Judge James Spen-
cer, vacated Mrs. McDonnell's obstruction conviction.8 Governor
McDonnell was sentenced to two years in federal prison,9 and
Mrs. McDonnell was sentenced to one year and one day in federal
prison." The indictment and subsequent convictions sent shock-
waves through the Virginia political establishment, with some
claiming that the government had sought to criminalize politics
as usual, and others claiming that the government had merely
aggressively pursued corruption."
The indictment tells a story of corruption. It asserts that the
former Governor traded official acts for money, goods, and ser-
vices. 2 The indictment suggests the McDonnells received mone-
tary gifts, loans, trips, and merchandise in exchange for help
promoting Star Scientific products, specifically for encouraging
state university researchers to study the products to increase
5. See Indictment, supra note 2, 108-23. The relevant obstruction charge is codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2012).
6. See Verdict, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. See United States v. McDonnell, No, 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383,
at *14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014) (noting insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction).
9. Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp.
3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14cr00012-001), 2015 WL 398949.
10. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783
(E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14cr00012-002), 2015 WL 1324853.
11. See, e.g., Travis Fain, Top Story of 2014: The Conviction of Bob and Maureen
McDonnell, DAILY PRESS (Dec. 20, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politi
cs/dp-nws/mcdonnell-trial-top-story-20141220-story.html (suggesting that following the
announcement of the jury verdicts, "it was like the shocking finale of a summer-long soap
opera"); Ruth Marcus, McDonnell Case is Not Politics as Usual, WASH. POST (Jan. 23,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-mcdonnell-case-is-not-politi
cs.as.usual2014/01/23/Ob6cc2b2-846d-1le3-9dd4-e7278db8Od86_story.html (noting both
sides of the argument).
12. See Indictment, supra note 2, 22.
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their marketability as drugs and for attempting to help get Star
Scientific products included for coverage by the state health in-
surance program. 3 If the verdicts reflect the truth of the allega-
tions in the indictment, the prosecution is merely the govern-
ment's attempt to address corruption and influence peddling.
Conversely, the McDonnells suggest that no unlawful conduct
occurred. Though Williams gave the Governor and his family
gifts, loans, and goods, the defense argued that the Governor took
no official acts for Williams's benefit. 4 The defense asserted that
Governor McDonnell merely engaged in behavior that governors
routinely engage in, including arranging meetings that connect
businesses with state government and attending receptions and
luncheons. 5 The defense suggests that the prosecution was a
misguided attempt to criminalize legal behavior embedded in
everyday politics. 6
Both sides could be correct. It is possible the McDonnells vio-
lated laws that criminalize politics as usual. However, it is also
possible the McDonnells are guilty of public corruption under
laws that reasonably criminalize public corruption. Whether the
laws at issue appropriately punish public corruption or merely
criminalize politics as usual depends on the laws' scope. How that
issue should be resolved depends on a core point of contention be-
tween the prosecution and defense: whether Governor McDonnell
promised to take or took official action on behalf of Williams and
Star Scientific. The trial court and Fourth Circuit have spoken in
this case and found that Governor McDonnell did take official
acts for Williams's benefit. This article considers how those courts
addressed the issue.
This article discusses two additional issues the McDonnell case
raises. The first issue is how much evidence is necessary to sus-
tain a conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding.
Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of attempting to obstruct the
grand jury in this case for sending a misleading note to Williams,
13. See id. 17, 22, 44, 48, 60, 74.
14. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 506 (4th Cir. 2015). Governor
McDonnell argued that the trial court defimed official acts so broadly as to incorrectly en-
compass all actions taken by a public official. See id. at 505.
15. Id. at 506.
16. See id.
20151
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but her actions were deemed insufficient to support her obstruc-
tion conviction.17 The other issue relates to the McDonnells' sen-
tencing. The sentences they received were much shorter than the
sentences calculated using the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines."8 This article considers the official act issue, the obstruction
issue, and the sentencing issue. Part I describes the relationship
between the McDonnells and Williams. Part II discusses what of-
ficial acts a public official must take to be guilty under the public
corruption statutes the McDonnells were convicted of violating.
Part III discusses Mrs. McDonnell's obstruction charge. Part IV
discusses issues surrounding the McDonnells' sentencing.
I. THE MCDONNELL-WILLIAMS RELATIONSHIP
The indictment describes the relationship between the McDon-
nells and Jonnie Williams."9 It notes how the relationship began,
what Williams wanted from the relationship, what actions the
McDonnells took in favor of Williams and Star Scientific, and
what gifts the McDonnells received from Williams."° The indict-
ment suggests a relationship that began as an acquaintance, but
soon transformed into an arrangement in which Williams gave
the McDonnells what they wanted in return for helping, when
necessary, to move Star Scientific's interests forward.2' It sug-
gests a relationship that spawned public corruption.
The McDonnells did not know Williams before Governor
McDonnell's gubernatorial campaign.22 Though Williams allowed
Governor McDonnell to use his plane during the campaign,23 Gov-
ernor McDonnell and Williams were mere professional acquaint-
ances, not personal friends, at the time.24 However, Williams and
the McDonnells became better acquainted soon after Governor
17. See infra notes 133-38, 153-66 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 193-210.
19. The assertions made in the indictment were largely supported or confirmed by
trial evidence. See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486-93.
20. Indictment, supra note 2, 22.






McDonnell's election.25 During one discussion between Williams
and Mrs. McDonnell, Williams offered to pay for Mrs. McDon-
nell's dress for the inauguration."s She declined the offer after be-
ing told that accepting it would be inappropriate.27
In the first year of his term, Governor McDonnell increased his
contact with Williams. In October 2010, Williams allowed Gover-
nor McDonnell to use Williams's plane to fly from Richmond, Vir-
ginia, to a political event in Sacramento, California.28 On the re-
turn trip to Richmond, Williams discussed with Governor
McDonnell the benefits of anatabine, a key ingredient in some of
Star Scientific's products, and asked for help from the Virginia
government to support and promote Star Scientific's products.29
Through late 2010 and early 2011, Governor McDonnell worked
to promote Star Scientific and its products. For example, Gover-
nor McDonnell's staff set up a meeting between Williams and the
Virginia Secretary of Health in which Williams discussed the
health benefits of Star Scientific's products. 0 In addition, in Feb-
ruary 2011, the McDonnells attended a Star Scientific event at
the Jefferson Hotel in Richmond, Virginia, where Governor
McDonnell spoke in support of the company."
The indictment also asserts that, in April 2011, the relation-
ship morphed into a transactional one in which the McDonnells
traded official actions for gifts and other material support from
Williams.32 Specifically, Williams and Star Scientific needed re-
search studies for Anatabloc, one of Star Scientific's products, so
that its scientific value could be proven.33 Governor McDonnell
tried to help.34 The indictment suggests that the Governor did so
25. See id. 15.
26. Id.





32. See id. 22.
33. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing
studies that Williams and Star Scientific needed).
34. See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 790 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff'd, 792
F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing specific ways in which Governor McDonnell attempted
to aid Williams and Star Scientific).
20151
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throughout the length of the transactional relationship, which
continued until March 2013."5
During this time, the McDonnells took a number of steps to
help support and promote Star Scientific products, though Wil-
liams's desired studies never materialized.36 In early June 2011,
Mrs. McDonnell and her Chief of Staff (a Virginia government
employee) visited the Roskamp Institute in Florida, an entity
working with Star Scientific.37 While there, Mrs. McDonnell of-
fered the Virginia Governor's Mansion as the site for the product
launch of Anatabloc. 3' Governor McDonnell had also planned to
visit the Institute and had one of his staff members ask the Vir-
ginia Secretary of Health for input on the Institute, but ultimate-
ly he did not visit. 9 In late July 2011, Governor McDonnell asked
the Virginia Secretary of Health to have a deputy meet with Mrs.
McDonnell to discuss Anatabloc. ° The deputy met with Mrs.
McDonnell and Williams at the Governor's Mansion to discuss
studies that Virginia researchers might conduct using Anata-
bloc.41 Williams indicated during the meeting that he had dis-
cussed funding for these studies with Governor McDonnell. 2 In
August 2011, the McDonnells hosted the product launch for Ana-
tabloc at the Governor's Mansion.43 In a March 2012 meeting with
high-level government officials regarding the Virginia state em-
ployee health plan, Governor McDonnell endorsed the health
35. Indictment, supra note 2, 22.
36. See id. (describing in general terms the nature of the transactional relationship
between the McDonnells and Williams); id. 65 (noting that University of Virginia admin-
istrators, who are Virginia government employees, did not agree to Star Scientific's re-
quest to grant funding applications for a scientific study of anatabine); see also Julie Zau-
zmer, Anatabloc, Supplement at Center of McDonnell Trial, to Be Taken Off the Market,
WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/anatabloc-supplement-
at-center-of-mcdonnell-trial-to-be-taken-off-the-market/2014/08/11/40lf4ca-2 1a7-1 le4-95
8c-268a320a60ce_story.html (reporting that Rock Creek Pharmaceuticals, formerly known
as Star Scientific, announced it would halt sales of Anatabloc, the dietary supplement
promoted by Governor McDonnell, until it resolved issues with the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, as it has not been approved).
37. See Indictment, supra note 2, 40.
38. Id. 40.




43. See id. 40, 60.
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benefits of Anatabloc and suggested that the state officials meet
with Star Scientific officials about Anatabloc."
Throughout the transactional relationship, Williams provided
various gifts, loans, and goods to the McDonnells and their fami-
ly.4" Counts six through eleven of the indictment focus on three
checks and a wire transfer to the McDonnells or their business
interests totaling $135,000, and two instances of Williams paying
for golf outings for Governor McDonnell or members of his family
costing approximately $3800.46 These payments occurred from
May 2011 through May 2012."7 The indictment noted, but did not
include in the charges, other gifts such as vacations the McDon-
nells took that were paid for by Williams. 8 The indictment also
listed many additional goods that Williams gave the McDonnell
family that were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of the scheme
charged in the indictment.49
In addition, the indictment states that the McDonnells at-
tempted to conceal the nature and extent of their financial rela-
tionship with Williams."0 Though some of the gifts and transac-
tions between Williams and the McDonnells were disclosed,"
Governor McDonnell structured some transactions to avoid dis-
closing their nature.52 He also failed to fully disclose, intentionally
or not, the extent of his financial relationship with Williams and
Star Scientific.53 Mrs. McDonnell also attempted to avoid disclo-
sure of the extent of her financial dealings with Williams and
44. Id. 88.
45. See id. 68 (discussing the Rolex watch, purchased by Williams, that Mrs.
McDonnell gave Governor McDonnell); Rosalind S. Helderman, Matt Zapotosky & Laura
Vozzella, Executive Gave Gifts to Virginia First Family 'Because They're Helping,' WASH.
POST (July 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/star-witness-it
-was-wrong-to-give-rolex-to-va-governor/2014/07/31b3807a72-18bd- 1le4-9e3b-7f2f110c62
65-story.html?hpid=z2&tid=ptvrellink (discussing Williams's testimony regarding his
$50,000 loan to Governor McDonnell to help pay for properties Governor McDonnell and
his sister owned in Virginia Beach).
46. Indictment, supra note 2, 117.
47. Id.
48. Id. 46, 94, 108-23.
49. Id. at Forfeiture Notice.
50. Id. 111.
51. Id. 1 70, 98.
52. See id. 1 83, 86.
53. See id. 11 102, 103.
20151
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Star Scientific.54 She also falsely stated in an interview with law
enforcement officers that Governor McDonnell and Williams first
met well before his gubernatorial campaign.55 In addition, she
drafted and sent a misleading note to Williams that was appar-
ently meant to suggest that certain gifts of clothing were merely
loans of clothing. 6 That note was at the core of the obstruction
charge against her. 7
The indictment summarizes the McDonnell-Williams relation-
ship as such:
[From in or about April 2011 through in or about March 2013, the
defendants participated in a scheme to use Robert McDonnell's offi-
cial position as the Governor of Virginia to enrich the defendants
and their family members by soliciting and obtaining payments,
loans, gifts, and other things of value from J[onnie] W[illiams] and
Star Scientific in exchange for Robert McDonnell and the O[ffice of
the] G[overnor of] V[irginia] performing official actions on an as-
needed basis, as opportunities arose, to legitimize, promote, and ob-
tain research studies for Star Scientific's products, including Anata-
bloc. And as also detailed below, the defendants took steps through-
out that time to conceal the scheme.
Though this description appears to document various instances of
public corruption and other crimes, the question remains precise-
ly how the McDonnells actually violated the laws they were
charged with breaking.
II. THE PUBLIC CORRUPTION CHARGES: HONEST-SERVICES WIRE
FRAUD AND THE HOBBS ACT
The McDonnells were convicted of multiple public corruption
crimes: honest-services wire fraud, Hobbs Act violations, and con-
spiracy to do both.59 Colloquially, the McDonnells were convicted
of bribery, e.g., trading money and goods for promises of official
action or actual official action in favor of Jonnie Williams and
54. See id. 61.
55. Id. 104.
56. See id. 107; see also United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166383, at *4, *6-8, *13-14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014) (finding evidence to support
that the note was a fabrication, even though the conviction for obstruction was vacated).
57. Indictment, supra note 2, 123.
58. Id. 22.
59. See Verdict, supra note 1.
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Star Scientific. s° There is no doubt that the McDonnells received
money and goods from Williams. 1 What is at issue is whether
Governor McDonnell promised to engage in official action or ac-
tually engaged in official action for money and goods. Both the
honest-services wire fraud and the Hobbs Act convictions depend
on whether Governor McDonnell accepted or solicited bribes.
That, in turn, depends on whether he engaged in, or promised to
engage in, official acts."
A. Honest-Services Wire Fraud and Hobbs Act Doctrine
Honest-services wire fraud is of fairly recent vintage, though
wire fraud has been unlawful for years. 3 Wire fraud is similar to
mail fraud and occurs when a person engages in a scheme to de-
fraud by using the wires in interstate or foreign commerce.64 Hon-
est-services wire fraud exists when a person plans a scheme to
defraud which causes one party to violate a duty of loyalty or
trust owed to another, but which does not cause direct financial
harm to the party owed the duty of loyalty or trust. 5
The honest-services mail/wire fraud cause of action has had an
uneven path. In McNally v. United States, the Court rejected the
theory of honest-services wire fraud when the government at-
tempted to expand the reach of wire and mail fraud to cover
schemes in which the putative victim was not defrauded of prop-
60. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 504 (4th Cir. 2015) (focusing on
bribery law and how it applies to honest-services wire fraud and the Hobbs Act).
61. See id. at 518-19.
62. United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 788 (E.D. Va. 2014), affd, 792
F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015).
63. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 1346, 102 Stat. 4508 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012)); Communications Act Amendments of 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-554, 66. Stat. 722 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012)).
64. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (criminalizing "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud" that uses the mail "for the purpose of executing such scheme ... or attempting so to
do . . ."), with 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (criminalizing "any scheme or artifice to defraud"
that uses the wires "in interstate or foreign commerce ... for the purpose of executing
such scheme...").
65. See, e.g., United States v. Nayak, 769 F.3d 978, 979 (7th Cir. 2014). In Nayak, the
defendant pled guilty to mail fraud for bribing physicians to refer patients to outpatient
surgery centers. Id. The government admitted that the schemes did not cause physical or
monetary harm to the patients but prevailed when the court found that tangible harm is
not required to support an honest-services mail fraud conviction. Id. at 984.
2015]
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erty.66 McNally involved an insurance scheme in which defend-
ants chose the insurance agents who were to secure workmen's
compensation insurance for the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
then forced the agents to share some of the commissions with
other insurance agencies the defendants designated.67 The de-
fendants then funneled money to friends and insurance agencies
in which they had a financial interest." Ostensibly, no one was
defrauded by the scheme.69 The insurance provider was not de-
frauded of money because the commissions were regular commis-
sions that the insurance company expected to pay to an agent.°
Kentucky was not defrauded of money because the commissions
were part of the fair premium Kentucky expected to pay. 71 The
agents who were forced to share the commissions may have been
hurt by being required to share commissions they arguably had
earned, but they were not tricked or defrauded 2
The federal government prosecuted the case under the theory
that the defendants had defrauded Kentucky and its citizens of
honest services and "the right to have the Commonwealth's af-
fairs conducted honestly. 73 The Supreme Court rejected that the-
ory, finding that the mail/wire fraud statute protected money and
property rights, but not "the intangible right of the citizenry to
good government." 4 In response to McNally, Congress quickly ex-
panded the mail and wire fraud statutes to cover "the intangible
right to honest services.""
Despite Congress's expansion of this statute to include honest-
services wire fraud, its scope was not clarified because Congress
66. See 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
67. See id. at 352, 360.
68. See id. at 352-53.
69. See id. at 360.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 360 (noting that Kentucky had not been defrauded).
72. See id. at 360-61 (noting "the premium for insurance would have been paid to
some agency" and that the defendants merely "assert[ed] control" over the commissions
paid to the designated insurance agents).
73. Id. at 352.
74. Id. at 356, 360.
75. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012)) ("[Ihe term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' in-
cludes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.");
see also Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 364, 401-02 (2010).
[Vol. 50:237
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did not provide a definition of the intangible right to honest ser-
vices. 6 However, in Skilling v. United States, the Court clarified
the boundaries of honest-services wire/mail fraud by narrowing it
to apply only to schemes involving bribery and kickbacks.7 Con-
sequently, for all its seeming uncertainty, the application of the
honest-services fraud claim to the McDonnell case is simple: if the
wires were used to facilitate a bribery or kickback scheme, hon-
est-services fraud applies.7
Similarly, for the Hobbs Act to apply in this context, Governor
McDonnell must have knowingly accepted a bribe.79 The Hobbs
Act bars persons from affecting commerce through extortion."0 Its
definition of extortion includes obtaining property from another"under color of official right,"81 which historically was considered
the equivalent of taking a bribe.82 Though the definition of extor-
tion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act has been
broadened under the Hobbs Act, taking or soliciting a bribe still
83forms its essence .
B. Bribery and Official Acts
Bribery in the public arena requires that a public official prom-
ise to take, or actually take, official action in exchange for gifts or
other things of value.84 Though the McDonnells were not charged
76. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 416.
77. Id. at 368, 409.
78. See id. at 368 (deeming honest-services fraud to encompass bribery and kickback
schemes).
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258-59, 268
(1992).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) ("Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays,
or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery
or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.").
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) ("The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of proper-
ty from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right.").
82. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 260.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012); Evans, 504 U.S. at 260-63.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012).
2015]
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85with violating the federal bribery statute, it informs honest-
services wire fraud and the Hobbs Act.86 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has noted that a public official violates the Hobbs Act when
that official "has obtained a payment to which he was not enti-
tled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official
acts."87 However, what constitutes an official act, an issue at the
heart of the McDonnell case, is a live one.8
The federal bribery statute defines an official act as "any deci-
sion or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by
law be brought before any public official, in such official's official
capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit."8 This defini-
tion leaves the scope of an official act somewhat unclear. Under
the definition, an official act could be thought to be limited to the
duties that an official is required to discharge. Conversely, an of-
ficial act could be thought to extend to every action an official
takes in the official's official capacity. ° Governor McDonnell ar-
gued that an official act should be defined relatively narrowly and
sought a definition of an official act that focused on the governor's
official duties and functions.9
In United States v. McDonnell, the Fourth Circuit explained
that official acts are not narrowly limited to an official's' official
duties.9" Rather, official acts can include not only actions that a
public official must discharge, but also can "encompass the cus-
tomary and settled practices of an office . . . ."" If the acts at issue
are activities that a public official routinely engages in while in
the official's official capacity, the activity can qualify as an official
85. See Indictment, supra note 2 108-23.
86. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879,
918-19 (2005).
87. Evans, 504 U.S. at 268.
88. See United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166390,
at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014); Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of
White Collar Crime Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
33, 39 (2012).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012).
90. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F. 3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015).
91. See id. at 506 (noting Governor McDonnell's argument that the scope of official act
as defined by district court was too broad).
92. Id. at 506-07.
93. Id. at 509.
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act.94 The key is not whether the act is required by law or is sig-
nificant in scope, but whether the act is related to "influenc[ing] a'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' that may
be brought before the government." 96 Almost any action taken by
a public official can be an official act if it relates to an official is-
sue that can be brought or has been brought before the govern-
ment.9 6
The Fourth Circuit's decision was not surprising, as it flowed
directly from United States Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit
precedent. In United States v. Birdsall, the Court considered
what constituted official action in the context of the precursor
statute to the federal bribery statute.97 There, the Court deter-
mined that actions not required by law, but established by settled
practice, could constitute official action." In United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers of California, the Supreme Court took a simi-
lar position regarding what constitutes an official act under the
current federal bribery statute.99 In Sun-Diamond, the Court not-
ed that many acts that were not a part of an official's official duty
could constitute official acts when they were undertaken in rela-
tion to a matter before the government. °0
In addition, the Fourth Circuit recently discussed the nature of
an official act in Jefferson v. United States, a 2012 honest-services
wire fraud and bribery case involving Congressman William Jef-
ferson.' In Jefferson, the Fourth Circuit found that acts that Jef-
ferson was not required to take by law, but did undertake in his
94. See id. at 507, 509.
95. Id. at 509.
96. Cf. at 506.
97. 233 U.S. 223, 230-31, 235-36 (1914); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, §
117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1109-10.
98. Cf. Birdsall, 233 U.S. at 235. In Birdsall, the government alleged that "federal
officers responsible for suppressing liquor traffic in Indian communities" were bribed "to
advise the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to recommend leniency for individuals convict-
ed of liquor trafficking offenses involving Indians." McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 506-07 (citing
Birdsall, 233 U.S. at 227, 229-30). The recommendations at issue were outside their offi-
cial duties, but were considered official acts covered by the applicable bribery statute.
Birdsall, 233 U.S. at 231.
99. 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999).
100. See id. at 407-08.
101. 674 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2012).
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role as a congressman, could qualify as official acts." 2 Jefferson's
core criminal conduct involved helping to arrange deals between
American companies and African entities on the condition that
money would be directed to businesses owned by Jefferson's fami-
ly members.1 1 3 Jefferson argued that the actions he took did not
amount to official acts under the relevant statutes and that there
was no exchange of money for acts as the statutes required. 4 Jef-
ferson urged a narrow definition, arguing that an official act had
to be related to a legislative or governmental function or pro-
cess."5 The court rejected that position, deeming official acts to
include those activities in which an official in the defendant's po-
sition customarily engages in.' 6 Though the official act must be
related to a government decision or action, it need not relate to
voting on, or introducing, legislation.0 7 The court ruled that Jef-
ferson's use of his position to help facilitate the success of various
business ventures of people paying him to do so constituted offi-
cial acts supporting Jefferson's convictions.0 8 Given the Jefferson
decision, Governor McDonnell's argument regarding the scope of
official acts was nearly certain to be rejected by the Fourth Cir-
cuit.
Given how the Supreme Court and other courts have defined
official acts, the Fourth Circuit's decision that the actions Gover-
nor McDonnell promised to, and actually did, take to help Wil-
liams and Star Scientific were official acts is no surprise.0 9 Gov-
102. See id. at 357.
103. See id. at 356.
104. Id. at 336 (noting that Jefferson had argued for narrower definition of official act
that limited such acts to "activities involving questions pending or brought before Con-
gress, such as voting on proposed legislation or conducting committee work").
105. See id. at 336, 338.
106. See id. at 357 (approving jury instruction that "explained to the jury that an offi-
cial act need not be prescribed by statute, but rather may include acts that a congressman
customarily performs, even if the act falls outside the formal legislative process").
107. See id. at 337.
108. See id. at 356 (noting that Jefferson's acts included "corresponding with and visit-
ing with foreign officials," "[s]cheduling and conducting meetings with Army officials and
representatives, at which he promoted [various businesses]," and vouching for business
owners to help them secure contracts in foreign countries).
109. See United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruling that
a public official seeking to influence the granting of city demolition contracts could be con-
victed of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act because of informal influence over process, de-
spite no official power to award demolition contracts). See generally United States v.
Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruling that a mayor had violated the Hobbs Act
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ernor McDonnell directed staff to set up meetings with high-
ranking government officials to discuss Anatabloc." ° He used his
official position to get Star Scientific products significant expo-
sure that those products would not have otherwise gotten, includ-
ing holding a product launch at the Governor's Mansion for Ana-
tabloc."' He attempted to facilitate and encourage state
university researchers to research Star Scientific products.12 He
suggested that government officials consider having Star Scien-
tific products covered under the state's health plan.113 Each of
these activities could be considered official action. 114
Governor McDonnell's claim that his actions should not be
deemed official acts is ironic. Had the Virginia Secretary of
Health pushed to treat Star Scientific products as pharmaceuti-
cals or had other administration officials moved to get Star Scien-
tific products covered by the state employee health plan, Gover-
nor McDonnell's actions would have been integral to those
actions. He could have then reasonably claimed credit for bring-
ing Star Scientific products, economic development, and addition-
al jobs to Virginia. The suggestion that Governor McDonnell was
merely doing what a governor is supposed to do is precisely the
point. The actions that governors traditionally take on matters of
interest to the state may constitute official action even if they are
not required by law to be taken."'
Once the court decided that official acts had occurred, the dis-
pute shifted to whether Governor McDonnell took goods in ex-
change for performing, or promising to perform, these official
acts."6 Once the Fourth Circuit found that official acts had oc-
curred and money changed hands, it was nearly obligated to al-
low the jury to decide whether Governor McDonnell traded money
for official acts.' 7 Ample evidence was presented to support this
when he exchanged favors for money).
110. United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 516 (4th Cir. 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 517.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Cf. United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 352, 357 (4th Cir. 2012).
116. See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 518.
117. See, e.g., id. at 519; United States v. Hamilton, 701 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2012)
(indicating it is the jury's role to make factual inferences).
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claim,"8 and the jury ultimately found that Governor McDonnell
traded money and goods for official action."9
C. The Line Between Bribery and Politics As Usual
Those who are concerned that the line between bribery and pol-
itics as usual has not been sufficiently defined or that Governor
McDonnell's acts were not quite serious enough to constitute
bribery should consider the full breadth of the federal bribery
statute. Its first part relates to bribery; its second part relates to
illegal gratuities. 2 ° Bribery focuses on paying or offering to pay
an official to influence an official act, or requesting or receiving
payment in order to influence or take an official action.12' It sug-
gests a purchase of official action. Illegal gratuities focus on offer-
ing payment or paying a public official because of an official act
already performed or that was to be performed.'2 It is akin to a
thank you for a job well done. The illegal gratuities law can be vi-
olated even if the public official was planning to perform, would
have performed, or actually did perform the official action with-
out any expectation of payment. 3
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the
dispute focused on illegal gratuities and considered whether giv-
ing an official a gift merely because of the recipient's position vio-
lated the illegal gratuities law.'24 The district court had deter-
mined that the illegal gratuities statute is violated whenever a
gift is given to a covered public official by virtue of his position. 2'
The defense argued that such a gift had to be given in relation to
specific official acts taken or to be taken regarding business in
front of the official. 2 ' The Court determined that gifts given mere-
118. See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 518-19.
119. See id. at 519 n.23 (indicating that the "jury found the necessary corrupt intent").
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (barring bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012) (barring
illegal gratuities).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
122. Id.
123. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05
(1999).
124. Id. at 400.
125. See id. at 402-03.
126. See id. To be clear, the money must be provided because of official action, includ-
ing a general course of action that includes a number of acts. However, the money need
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ly by virtue of the official's position did not violate the law when
there was no specific official action that could be linked to the
gift. 27
Bribery and illegal gratuities are both illegal, though they are
treated very differently under the statute. Bribery is punishable
by up to fifteen years in prison, while an illegal gratuities convic-
tion is punishable by up to two years in prison.'28 Though the po-
tential punishments may be quite different, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") do not treat public sec-
tor bribery and illegal gratuities nearly as differently as 18 U.S. C.
§ 201 suggests. 29 Consequently, even if the McDonnells were pas-
sive participants in this matter-the indictment claims they were
not-accepting payment knowing that the payment was for offi-
cial acts taken or to be taken is unlawful and is serious.
The McDonnell case clarifies bribery, honest-services wire
fraud, and the Hobbs Act's under-color-of-official-right extortion.
Those crimes entail three questions: Was money offered or paid to
a public official, did the public official engage in or promise to en-
gage in official acts, and was the money offered tied to the prom-
ise to engage in official acts?2 ' Whether money was offered or
paid should be an easy question. Whether official acts were prom-
ised may be a difficult fact question in some cases, but what con-
stitutes an official act has been clarified.' The Fourth Circuit has
determined that almost any act a public official takes in the offi-
cial's official capacity can be an official act. 13
2
not be tied directly to a specific act. See United States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 358-59
(4th Cir. 2012).
127. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c) (2012).
129. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014) (indicating an initial base offense level of 14 for a public official convicted of
bribery), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014) (indicating an initial base offense level of 11 for a public official convicted of accept-
ing illegal gratuities). Other parts of the Guidelines explain how to determine the base
offense level and the appropriate sentence. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5,
pt. A, cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
130. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (detailing the bribery statute); 18 U.S.C. §
1343 (2012) (detailing the honest-services wire fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (de-
tailing the Hobbs Act).
131. See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2015).
132. See id.
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Given this clarification, the focus should be on whether the act
taken is tied to official business in front of the official or the gov-
ernment. Whether the money was tied to the promise to engage
in official acts is a quintessential fact question that should be left
to the jury to decide. The McDonnell case may not have been an
easy case, but it should make future cases easier to decide assum-
ing the Supreme Court allows it to stand. The rules are relatively
simple; officials are not supposed to get paid by citizens or busi-
nesses to do their jobs, and officials are not to be thanked mone-
tarily for doing their jobs. If that criminalizes politics as usual,
then politics as usual will need to change.
III. MRS. MCDONNELL'S OBSTRUCTION CHARGE
Though the jury convicted Mrs. McDonnell of attempting to ob-
struct a grand jury proceeding,'33 Judge Spencer found insuffi-
cient evidence to support the conviction and granted Mrs.
McDonnell's post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on that
conviction."' The indictment asserted that Mrs. McDonnell at-
tempted to obstruct the grand jury proceeding by sending Jonnie
Williams a box of clothing with a misleading note suggesting that
the clothing was merely lent to her, rather than given to her as a
gift. '35 In his opinion vacating the conviction, Judge Spencer noted
that "obstruction of justice requires more than just a misleading
note."'' 6 However, given that the court did not dismiss the ob-
struction charge before trial, a misleading note presumably could
be considered part of a larger plan constituting an attempt to ob-
struct justice."3 7 Unfortunately, the court did not clarify precisely
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2012) ("Whoever corruptly ... otherwise obstructs, in-
fluences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."); United States v. McDonnell, No.
3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
134. See United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383,
at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
135. Indictment, supra note 2, 123 (suggesting that the note "falsely attempted to
make it appear that she and J[onnie] W[illiams] had previously discussed and agreed that
the defendant would return certain designer luxury goods rather than keep them perma-
nently"); see also id. 107.
136. McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *8.
137. See id. at *6-7. Mrs. McDonnell had moved to dismiss the obstruction charge be-
fore trial. See Memorandum in Support of Maureen G. McDonnell's Motion #11-Motion to
Dismiss, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-cr-12-
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how much additional evidence would have been sufficient to con-
vict Mrs. McDonnell, though the court was under no obligation to
do so."'
A. Doctrine of Obstruction
The statute Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of violating-18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)-criminalizes "corruptly... obstruct[ing], in-
fluenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding, or attempt[ing]
to do so." '' In this case, the official proceeding is the grand jury
proceeding that triggered the indictment.' Though the official
proceeding need not have been pending or imminent at the time
of the attempt to obstruct it,'4 the proceeding must have been
foreseeable at the time the defendant took the action that consti-
tutes obstruction.142 In addition, a defendant must have taken an
action that could have the natural and probable effect of influenc-
ing the grand jury proceeding.' A defendant who is unaware that
his or her actions will likely affect a grand jury proceeding cannot
be proven to have had the intent necessary to obstruct such a
grand jury proceeding.' 44 Though a defendant who merely sends a
misleading note to a friend does not obstruct a grand jury pro-
ceeding, a defendant who creates a misleading document to pre-
sent to a grand jury in an attempt to influence the grand jury ar-
guably has attempted to obstruct an official proceeding.' The
attempt to obstruct need not be successful to trigger guilt. 14 6
JRS), 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 16084.
138. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *7-8.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2012); McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *7.
140. See id. § 1515(a)(1)(A); see also McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *4.
141. See § 18 U.S.C 1512(f)(1) ("[A]n official proceeding need not be pending or about to
be instituted at the time of the offense .... ").
142. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005) (noting that
the required link between the obstructing actions and the obstructed proceeding suggests
that the proceeding must be foreseen for defendant to be deemed to have attempted to ob-
struct it).
143. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 601 n.2 (noting that false statements made to or documents supplied to
a grand jury can qualify as obstruction of the grand jury).
146. See id. at 601 ("were a defendant with the requisite intent to lie to a subpoenaed
witness who is ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does not transmit the
defendant's version of the story, the defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not ac-
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B. Proof of Obstruction
The prosecution appeared to suggest through the indictment
that Mrs. McDonnell did more than merely send a misleading
note; it suggested that the note was a part of a broader plan to
mislead the grand jury.4 7 The indictment indicated that law en-
forcement officers interviewed Mrs. McDonnell about her rela-
tionship with Williams in mid-February 2013.148 During the inter-
view, Mrs. McDonnell falsely claimed that she was making
payments on one of the loans that Williams had provided to the
McDonnells and that she falsely stated that Governor McDonnell
and Williams had met years before they actually met."9 Soon af-
ter the interview, the McDonnells engaged in multiple attempts
to recast the nature of some of their dealings with Williams.'
Similarly, after the interview, Mrs. McDonnell sent the mislead-
ing note to Williams."' Mrs. McDonnell appeared to draft the mis-
leading note to create the impression that the clothing had mere-
ly been lent to her rather than given to her."2 Presumably, the
misleading note could have been part of a plan to influence a
grand jury that might eventually see the note and might consider
whether the clothing was lent or given to Mrs. McDonnell rele-
vant to whether she or others had committed a crime.
The defense claimed that the note was insufficient proof of an
attempt to obstruct an official proceeding."3 According to the de-
fense, the note was not literally false and, therefore, could not
support Mrs. McDonnell's conviction."4 In addition, the defense
claimed that the note was unconnected to the grand jury proceed-
tually obstructed, justice. Under our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.").
147. See United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383,
at *8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
148. Indictment, supra note 2, 104.
149. Id.
150. See id. 105 (describing attempts to clarify loan applications to reflect that money
provided to the McDonnells should be considered loans rather than omitted from the
McDonnells' liabilities).
151. See id. 1 107.
152. See id. 123.
153. See Memorandum in Support of Maureen G. McDonnell's Motion #11-Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 137, at 11-12.
154. United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *7
(E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
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ing.151 If Mrs. McDonnell did not know about the grand jury pro-
ceeding, the defense argued, Mrs. McDonnell could not have in-
tended to obstruct it, and her conviction should be vacated."6 The
court largely agreed with the defense.157
If the misleading note was the only evidence against Mrs.
McDonnell supporting the obstruction conviction, vacating the
conviction was necessary. Though the court found Mrs. McDon-
nell's note sufficiently misleading to potentially obstruct the
grand jury proceeding, it also found that the note was insuffi-
ciently connected to the grand jury proceeding to serve as suffi-
cient proof of an attempt to obstruct the grand jury proceeding.'
In order to intend to obstruct the grand jury proceeding, Mrs.
McDonnell had to know or foresee that the grand jury proceeding
would occur. 9 The prosecution failed to prove that Mrs. McDon-
nell knew or believed that a federal grand jury proceeding would
ever occur.16° Indeed, at the time the misleading note was sent,
based on the evidence presented at trial, she knew only of the
federal securities investigation of Williams and of a state investi-
gation.'
The court also found that even had Mrs. McDonnell foreseen or
known of the grand jury's existence, insufficient evidence of Mrs.
McDonnell's intent to obstruct had been presented.'62 The intent
to obstruct requires that the obstructing actions have the natural
and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of
justice. 6 ' Creating and sending a misleading note that the drafter
155. See Memorandum in Support of Maureen G. McDonnell's Motion #11-Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 137, at 11.
156. See id.
157. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *13-14.
158. See id. at *7-8, *13.
159. See id. at *9 (suggesting that a defendant's conduct cannot have the natural and
probable effect of obstructing a proceeding if the defendant cannot foresee the proceeding);
cf. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08 (2005) ("It is, however,
one thing to say that a proceeding 'need not be pending or about to be instituted at the
time of the offense,' and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.").
160. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *13-14 ("And Mrs. McDonnell
was even affirmatively told by her then-counsel Emmet Flood that there was no federal
grand jury proceeding.").
161. Id. at*13 n.5.
162. See id. at*11-14.
163. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 601 (1995) (discussing 18 U.S.C. §
1503 in the context of a prosecution for obstructing a grand jury).
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had no reason to believe would be presented to a grand jury does
not have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the
due administration of justice."' In this case, the note was sent to
Williams, who Mrs. McDonnell may not have thought would be a
grand jury witness.165 Without evidence to prove that Mrs.
McDonnell believed that the note would be presented to a grand
jury, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that the
drafting and sending of the note would qualify as an attempt to
obstruct an official proceeding.'66
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Though the court may have been correct that insufficient evi-
dence was presented to support the conviction, it did not indicate
how much evidence would have been sufficient to support a con-
viction for obstructing a grand jury proceeding.'67 That issue is
important because, in the context of this case, it appeared Mrs.
McDonnell intended to do more than merely send a misleading
note. ' The misleading note that Mrs. McDonnell sent was not
sent in a vacuum.6 9 It was sent after she was interviewed by law
enforcement officers about matters related to Williams and mon-
ey he had provided to the McDonnells. "' Importantly, the note
was sent to Williams, who knew that the clothes were gifts to
Mrs. McDonnell that he did not expect to be returned."' Indeed,
the clothes were returned nearly two years after they were pur-
chased.'72 Presumably, Mrs. McDonnell intended to mislead any-
164. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *13 ("Although Mrs. McDonnell
may have hoped that the misleading note would be provided to the future grand jury,
there is insufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mrs.
McDonnell knew this would happen.").
165. Cf. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601 (noting that a statement to an FBI agent who may or
may not testify in front of a grand jury "cannot be said to have the 'natural and probable
effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice").
166. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599 ("[I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions
are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.").
167. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
168. See id. at *7-8.
169. See id. at *8.
170. Indictment, supra note 2, T 104, 107.
171. See McDonnell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383, at *6-8.
172. See id. ("In March of 2013, Mrs. McDonnell delivered to Williams' brother, Donnie
Williams, a box which contained clothing that Williams had purchased for Mrs. McDonnell
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one who saw the note into believing that the clothes were not ex-
pensive gifts from Williams or to create a trail that suggested the
clothes were not gifts. Misleading someone other than Williams is
not the same as attempting to obstruct an official proceeding.
However, the note could have been an attempt to mislead law en-
forcement officers who might investigate the clothing or a mis-
guided attempt to provide Williams with evidence suggesting that
gifts had not been given. Such an attempt is not necessarily suffi-
cient to support an obstruction charge.73 However, it is more than
merely sending a misleading note.
Had Mrs. McDonnell drafted the note and given it to Williams
in an effort to have him present a story to a foreseeable grand ju-
ry, the obstruction charge would have been viable.'74 The indict-
ment did not allege that.'75 However, the indictment did suggest
that Mrs. McDonnell did more than merely send a misleading
note. "'76 The note was merely one piece in a process. Assuming the
allegations from the indictment were proven at trial, just how
close the indictment came to sufficiently supporting its claim is
an interesting question that this case leaves open.
IV. SENTENCING
How the McDonnells were sentenced may be the most interest-
ing aspect of this case. The McDonnells were convicted of serious
crimes, and the federal Guidelines, which apply to their crimes,
appear to recommend significant sentences.' 77 Nonetheless, Judge
in April 2011, along with a handwritten note.").
173. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 ("'We do not believe that uttering
false statements to an investigating agent.., who might or might not testify before a
grand jury is sufficient to make out a violation of the catchall provision of § 1503.").
174. Cf. id. at 601 (suggesting that providing false records directly to grand jury could
sustain obstruction charge).
175. See Indictment, supra note 2, 107, 123.
176. See id. 123.
177. The Presentence Report calculated Governor McDonnell's sentencing range as
121-151 months. Sentencing Position of the United States at 1, United States v. McDon-
nell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14cr12), 2014 WL 7405778. The United
States Probation Office calculated Mrs. McDonnell's sentencing range as sixty-three to
seventy-eight months. Matt Zapotsky, Maureen McDonnell Sentencing Guidelines Call for
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Spencer sentenced Governor McDonnell to twenty-four months in
prison and sentenced Mrs. McDonnell to one year and one day in
prison.7 ' Brief explanations of why the Guidelines exist and how
guideline sentences are calculated are important to understand-
ing what Judge Spencer did and why the sentencing is particular-
ly interesting.
A. Sentencing Guidelines
Before the Guidelines were promulgated, federal judges were
given broad discretion to determine criminal sentences. "9 Crimes
had statutory maximum and minimum sentences, but inside
those limits sentences were largely unregulated. 8 ° This latitude
led to widely divergent sentences for similar crimes.' The United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") was formed to
bring uniformity to sentencing.'82 The Commission created the
Guidelines, in part, by examining the factors that judges histori-
cally considered when sentencing defendants.'83 Though the
Guidelines were informed by historical data from judicial sen-
tencing, the Commission's opinions have affected the Guidelines
over time."'
The Guidelines standardize sentences by attempting to treat
criminal conduct of like severity in like fashion and to treat crim-
inal conduct of differing severity differently."8 8 The Guidelines
calculate an offense level based on the defendant's criminal con-
duct and combines that offense level with the defendant's crimi-
178. See supra notes 9-10; see also Jim Nolan, Bill McKelway & Graham Moomaw,
Maureen McDonnell Sentenced to 12 Months and a Day, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 20,
2015, 9:44 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article-b2
edb38e-af38-5c98-9144-d5b263c5b604.html; Zapotosky, supra note 177.
179. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1941 (1988); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh,
The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993).
180. See Stith & Koh, supra note 179, at 225-26.
181. See Ogletree, supra note 179, at 1944 (noting sentencing disparities).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012) (noting that the Commission's purpose includ-
ed ending "unwarranted sentencing disparities"); Ogletree, supra note 179, at 1945-46.
183. See Ogletree, supra note 179, at 1948.
184. See id. at 1944-46 (noting that Commission's expertise was supposed to affect the
Guidelines through policy statements in the Guidelines).
185. See id. at 1938-39.
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nal history to determine a guideline sentence range. 86 Before
United States v. Booker, judges were required to give a sentence
inside of the guideline sentencing range, subject to pre-approved
grounds for departure from that range."' Some departures were
based on grounds explicitly approved by the Commission;88 other
departures could be based on grounds relevant to sentencing that
the Commission had not considered.'89 Now, the Guidelines are
advisory.' A judge can determine a defendant's sentence based
on the guideline sentence range and whatever factors the judge
deems relevant to punishment.' The judge can do so regardless
of whether such factors are considered grounds for departure un-
der the Guidelines, as long as the sentence is inside the relevant
statutory maximum and minimum of the subject crimes and is
consistent with the factors noted in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).8 2
B. Calculating Sentences
Guideline sentences can be calculated relatively simply, though
the calculation can become somewhat complicated in any particu-
lar case. The first step is to find the crime the defendant was con-
victed of in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the "Manual").
93
Each federal crime and its offense level can be found in the Man-
ual or can be correlated to a section in the Manual.' Every crime
has a base offense level based on the seriousness of the crime.
186. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
188. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1, 5K2.0 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014). For example, a judge can depart upward or downward from the guideline
sentence if the Commission states specific grounds for departure, such as "substantial as-
sistance to authorities" or if the case involved good reasons that the sentencing commis-
sion had not considered. See id. However, certain factors such as race, sex, or national
origin cannot be considered as a reason for departure. See id. § 5H1. 10.
189. See id. § 5K2.0.
190. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46.
191. See id. at 259-60.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60 (discussing sentencing
under advisory guidelines regime).
193. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014).
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014) (providing base offense level for bribery, Hobbs Act, and honest-services
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The base offense level is then adjusted based on the defendant's
conduct.196 For example, if the defendant's course of conduct in-
volved multiple acts of deceit, the offense level of the crime might
be adjusted upward to reflect the fact that a course of conduct in-
volving multiple bad acts is more culpable than one involving a
single bad act. 197 Similarly, when a crime involves fraud, the size
of the defendant's gain or the victim's loss is a factor that affects
the offense level.19 The offense level may also be adjusted depend-
ing on the victim's characteristics, the scope of the defendant's
role in the criminal conduct, and whether the defendant attempt-
ed to obstruct justice, even if the obstruction was not charged.199
After all factors listed in the Guidelines are considered, the crime
yields an offense level."'
The process is repeated for each crime of which the defendant
was convicted.20 ' The crimes and offense levels are then combined
so that a single offense level for the defendant's criminal conduct
can be found.2 2 The sentencing rules that determine how criminal
counts are grouped effectively lessen the effect of a prosecutor's
charging decisions.02 For example, if a prosecutor is faced with
two identical courses of conduct, the prosecutor ought not be able
to increase a guideline sentence merely by charging the courses of
conduct differently, such as by breaking up one course of conduct
into multiple counts, so that the defendant is convicted of more
overall counts.
fraud violations); Ogletree, supra note 179, at 1946.
196. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(c)-(e) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
197. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014) (providing a higher offense level for cases involving multiple bribes as op-
posed to single bribes).
198. See id. § 2B1.1 (providing a higher offense level based on the amount of loss to vic-
tim).
199. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(c), 3C1.1(c) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2014). Characteristics considered may include factors relevant to
conduct that has not been charged or that was dismissed. See id. § 5K2.21.
200. See id. § 1B1.1(g).
201. Id. § 1Bl.1(a)(4).




Once the overall offense level has been calculated, the defend-
ant's criminal history is assessed."4 The more severe the defend-
ant's criminal history, the longer the guideline sentence range
will be.2" 5 A defendant with a more serious criminal history is pre-
sumed to deserve a longer punishment than a defendant with a
less serious criminal history who engages in the same criminal
conduct."' The offense level and the defendant's criminal history
are plotted on a sentencing grid, with the offense level on the ver-
tical axis and the defendant's criminal history on the horizontal
axis.20 7 The guideline sentence range for months of imprisonment
is listed where the offense level intersects with the defendant's
criminal history.2"8 Although it is no longer mandatory to follow
the Guidelines, a sentence inside of the sentencing range will be
deemed presumptively valid.0 9 The judge may then sentence
however the judge deems appropriate consistent with statutory
maximums and minimums and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).21°
C. The Guidelines and the McDonnells
The calculation of the guideline sentence in the McDonnell case
was fairly complex. However, rather than discuss the entire sen-
tencing calculation, this section considers a simplified calculation
based on the general nature of the charges of which the McDon-
nells were convicted. At base, Governor McDonnell was convicted
of taking bribes; Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of participating in
the scheme to take bribes.211 In addition, Mrs. McDonnell was
convicted of obstructing an official proceeding, though that con-
viction was vacated. ' The indictment suggests that Governor
204. Id. § 1Bl.1(a)(6).
205. See id. § 4A1.1; see id. ch. 5, pt. A.
206. See id. § 4A1.1; see id. ch. 5, pt. A, introductory cmt.
207. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.1.
208. Id.
209. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341, 354 (2007).
210. See id. at 347-48, 353.
211. See Verdict, supra note 1.
212. See United States v. McDonnell, No. 3:14-CR-12, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166383,
at *3, *13-14 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014). Obstruction of the due administration of justice,
whether charged or not, can increase a defendant's offense level or provide grounds for an
upward departure from a guideline sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) (increasing offense level based on obstruction); id.
§ 5K2.21 (allowing upward departure based on dismissed or uncharged conduct).
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McDonnell attempted to cover up some of his financial dealings
with Williams and Star Scientific, but he was acquitted of the
false statement charges brought based on that evidence. 13
A simplified sentencing calculation of Governor McDonnell's of-
fenses proceeds as follows. The base offense level for a Hobbs
Act/wire fraud violation of this type is 14 because Governor
McDonnell is a public official.214 The offense level increases by
four because the offense involved an elected official. 215 The offense
level then increases by two if more than one bribe was deemed to
be involved.21 The offense level further increases by six if the
bribes were valued between $30,000 and $70,000, or by ten if the
bribes were valued between $120,000 and $200,000.21' There is a
dispute regarding the value of Williams's gifts."' The face value of
the money and gifts provided by Williams under counts six
through eleven total just under $140,000.5' However, the
McDonnells claim that much of the value of the putative bribes
constitute loans that the McDonnells were prepared to repay with
interest.22 ° If that is so, calculating the bribe as the face value of
the loans may not seem appropriate. Excluding the loans, the
value of the gifts listed in counts six through eleven total just un-
der $19,000."l If one counts the $120,000 in loans as having a
relatively low value to the McDonnells, such as 10% of the face
213. See Indictment, supra note 2, 1 119; Verdict, supra note 1. Acquitted conduct can
be considered in sentencing. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
214. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014) (stating that the base offense level is 12 if the defendant is not a public official).
215. Id. § 2C1.1(b)(3).
216. Id. § 2C1.1(b)(1). There is a dispute about this. Governor McDonnell claims that
only one bribe existed given that the indictment suggested a general open-ended scheme
rather than particular payments for particular acts. See Defendant Robert F. McDonnell's
Objections to the Presentence Investigation Report at 26, United States v. McDonnell, 64
F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:12-CR-12), 2014 WL 7405777. However, the specific
payments alleged are not installment payments for a single bribe. They appear to be sepa-
rate unrelated payments over the course of the scheme.
217. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014).
218. See Defendant Robert F. McDonnell's Reply on Sentencing Position at 4-6, United
States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 3:14-cr-00012), 2015 WL
65503.
219. See Indictment, supra note 2, 117.
220. See Defendant Robert F. McDonnell's Objections to the Presentence Investigation
Report, supra note 216, at 8.
221. See Indictment, supra note 2, 117.
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value of the loans, the gifts plus the value of the loans would be
just over $30,000, and the offense level would increase by six.222
However, it is important to note that the gain/loss calculation
above does not include the value of the gifts Williams gave to the
McDonnell family that were deemed subject to forfeiture, but
were not subjects of specific counts, in the indictment.222 These
gifts include vacations the McDonnells took which were paid for
by Williams, a Rolex watch Mrs. McDonnell asked Williams to
purchase for Governor McDonnell, and other gifts given to the
McDonnells and their family members. 4
Governor McDonnell's guideline sentence would depend on how
his criminal conduct is characterized. If Governor McDonnell ac-
cepted a single bribe that involved just over $30,000, his offense
level would be 24.25 With the lowest criminal history category, his
guideline sentence would be fifty-one to sixty-three months in
prison." If Governor McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that in-
volved just over $30,000, his offense level would be 26 and his
guideline sentence would be sixty-three to seventy-eight months
in prison.227 If Governor McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that
involved nearly $140,000, his offense level would be 30 and his
222. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014). Treating the loans as having a value of 10% of the amount lent is not
meant to be a precise valuation of the loans. It merely recognizes that the loans had some
value to the McDonnells, but arguably should not be valued as if the loan was a gift that
was not going to be repaid. The key issue is that the loans can be valued in a way that
places the value of the gifts/bribes somewhere between $30,000 and $140,000 for sentenc-
ing purposes.
223. See Indictment, supra note 2, 117, Forfeiture Notice (showing more property and
gifts to be forfeited than were used for specific counts in the indictment).
224. See id. 46, 94, 117, Forfeiture Notice.
225. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(D), 2C1.1(a)(1), 2C1.1
(b)(2)-(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
226. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014) (using the sentencing table for a level 24 offense).
227. See id. §§ 2BI.1(b)(1)(D), 2C1.1(a)(1), 2C1.1(b)(1)-(3); see id. ch. 5, pt. A.
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guideline sentence would be 97 to 121 months in prison."' Gover-
nor McDonnell was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison.229
Mrs. McDonnell's sentence calculation is similar. Her base of-
fense level for a Hobbs Act/honest-services violation is 12 because
she is not a public official.2 " Her offense level increases by four
because the offense involved an elected official.23' If multiple
bribes were involved, her offense level increases by two.232 The is-
sue of the value of the gifts is slightly different for Mrs. McDon-
nell because she was acquitted of counts nine and eleven of the
indictment.233 If 10% of the face value of the loans, rather than the
full face value of the loans is added to the value of gifts for the
counts of which she was convicted, the result would yield just
over $27,000 and a four-level increase to her offense level.236 If the
full face value of the loans is counted, the result would be just
over $117,000, but less than $120,000 in money and goods re-
ceived. 237 Based on that amount, her offense level would rise by
eight.23" As with the calculation above regarding Governor
McDonnell, Mrs. McDonnell's value calculation does not include
other gifts provided to her and her family as a result of the
scheme.239
Mrs. McDonnell's guideline sentence would depend on how her
conduct is characterized. If Mrs. McDonnell accepted a single
bribe that involved just over $27,000, her offense level would be
20.240 With the lowest criminal history, her guideline sentence
228. See id. The analysis above excludes factors that could increase the Governor's
guideline sentencing range, including a 2-level increase in offense level for obstruction of
justice. See id. § 3C1.1. The Presentence Report calculated a guideline sentence of 121-151
months based in part on a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. Sen-
tencing Position of the United States, supra note 177, at Part I.C.
229. Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 9, at 3.
230. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
231. See id. § 2C1.1(b)(3).
232. See id. § 2C1.1(b)(1).
233. See Verdict, supra note 1.
236. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C).
237. See Indictment, supra note 2, 117.
238. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
239. See Indictment, supra note 2, 117, Forfeiture Notice.
240. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), 2C1.1(a)(2), 2C1.1
(b)(2)-(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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would be thirty-three to forty-one months in prison.24 ' If Mrs.
McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that involved just over
$27,000, her offense level would be 22 and her guideline sentence
would be forty-one to fifty-one months in prison. 42 If Mrs.
McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that involved nearly
$140,000, her offense level would be 28 and her guideline sen-
tence would be seventy-eight to ninety-seven months in prison."'
Mrs. McDonnell was sentenced to one year and one day in pris-
244on.
D. Sentencing the McDonnells
Judge Spencer departed from the guideline sentencing ranges
for both Governor and Mrs. McDonnell. Whether his departures
are qualitatively large or small may depend on how one views the
McDonnells' course of conduct. Whether the departures are ap-
propriate depends on how one views the goals of the Guidelines
and Judge Spencer's explanation for departing from them. The
Guidelines are supposed to operationalize fairness and justice by
providing consistent sentences based in part on factors that judg-
es historically considered when sentencing and by providing lim-
ited discretion for judges to depart from sentences when neces-
sary or appropriate.2 5 However, if one views "justice" as meting
out individualized, fair sentences on a case-by-case basis or be-
lieves that no guidelines can have sufficient nuance to create fair
guideline sentences, a departure from a guideline sentence range
is the quintessence of rendering justice.
Judge Spencer provided his general thoughts on sentencing,
the Guidelines, and the case in the statement he made before
sentencing Governor McDonnell.16 He noted that he did not like
mandatory sentencing guidelines, but used the Guidelines as a
241. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
242. See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), 2C1.1(a)(2), 2C1.1(b)(1)-(3); see id. ch. 5, pt. A.
243. See id.
244. Judgment in a Criminal Case, supra note 10, at 3.
245. See Ogletree, supra note 179, at 1945-47.
246. Frank Green, Transcript: Judge Explains His Sentencing of McDonnell, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/govern
ment-politics/article_7lba6906-8951-5c3a-86e7-75dfbc12666b.html?.
2015]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
starting point. 247 He stated that when the Guidelines were man-
datory, he could not consider various factors important to sen-
tencing and was not allowed to grant "grace or mercy. ' 248 He indi-
cated that it would have been ridiculous for him to have been
required to give Governor McDonnell "seven or eight years in
prison" for what he did.249 However, he did note that he must con-
sider factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to find a sentence that
is fair and appropriate.2 °
Judge Spencer appears to have given Governor McDonnell
credit for being a good person and doing good public service.251 He
also appears to have given Governor McDonnell credit for his mil-
itary service.252 However, he also noted the severity of the crime
at issue and the jury's verdict finding that the Governor had in-
tended to defraud.252 Thus, Judge Spencer felt compelled to sen-
tence Governor McDonnell to prison time to reflect the serious-
251ness of the crimes. Judge Spencer then gave Governor
McDonnell a relatively short sentence of twenty-four months, fol-
lowed a few weeks later with a relatively short sentence of twelve
months and one day for Mrs. McDonnell.2 5 Judge Spencer's sen-
tences could be considered a large or fairly small departure from




250. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2012) (noting that the Guidelines are sup-
posed to be consistent with 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(2)).
251. See Green, supra note 246. The Guidelines do not ordinarily approve of a depar-
ture on those bases. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) ("Civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related con-
tributions; and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining wheth-
er a departure is warranted.").
252. Green, supra note 246. The Guidelines approve of a departure on that basis under
certain circumstances. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) ("Military service may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other
offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from
the typical cases covered by the guidelines.").
253. Green, supra note 246.
254. See id.
255. See id.; Nolan, McKelway & Moomaw, supra note 178.
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The Guidelines are supposed to focus on a defendant's criminal
conduct.256 If Judge Spencer viewed the McDonnells' conduct as
being somewhat less serious than their convictions suggest, a
downward departure from the sentencing range calculated under
the Guidelines may reflect how he believed the McDonnells
should have been charged and punished. For example, if Judge
Spencer believed that the McDonnells essentially engaged in a
gifts scandal that involved a $15,000 payment in the form of a
wedding gift, a few below-market-rate loans, and a number of
gifts that were better thought of as ingratiation payments rather
than as bribes, the value of the bribes paid would drop along with
the McDonnells' offense level.257 If Governor McDonnell were con-
sidered to have taken a single bribe or started the course of pay-
ments with a single agreement to help Williams and gained be-
tween $10,000 and $30,000 as a result, his offense level would fall
to 22 and yield a guideline sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-
one months."' Likewise, Mrs. McDonnell's offense level would fall
to 20 and yield a guideline sentencing range of thirty-three to for-
ty-one months.259
If the McDonnells' conduct were conceived in this way, Judge
Spencer's departure from the Guidelines sentencing range may
not have been particularly dramatic. Governor McDonnell would
have dropped from a minimum of forty-one months to twenty-four
months.26° Considering Judge Spencer's willingness to credit the
Governor's military service, that departure may not be deemed
much of a departure at all. Similarly, Mrs. McDonnell would have
dropped from a minimum of thirty-three months to twelve
months.261 Of course, Judge Spencer could simply ignore the cal-
culation and give Mrs. McDonnell half of the prison time than
Governor McDonnell's sentence because she is not a public offi-
cial. Under that approach, the departure may not be considered
256. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012).
257. See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 789 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff'd, 792
F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that ingratiation payments may not be enough to
trigger bribery charges).
258. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), 2CL.1(a)(1), 2C1.1
(b)(2)-(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014); see id. ch. 5, pt. A.
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particularly large. However, minimizing the McDonnells' course
of conduct in the manner suggested is problematic. Their conduct
did not indicate a one-time mistake; rather, the conduct lasted for
almost two years.262 Though the scheme only involved one person,
it involved a significant amount of money.263
In contrast, one could take the middle-ground sentence calcula-
tion from the simplified vision of the McDonnells' crimes from
Section C above. Under that approach, Governor McDonnell could
be deemed to have accepted multiple bribes that involved just
over $30,000, in which case his offense level would be 26 and his
guideline sentence would be sixty-three to seventy-eight months
in prison.264 Mrs. McDonnell could be deemed to have accepted
multiple bribes that involved just over $27,000, in which case her
offense level would be 22 and her guideline sentence would be for-
ty-one to fifty-one months in prison.26 However, even with a de-
parture that takes into consideration Governor McDonnell's mili-
tary service, bribery is a breach of public trust and lowering a
sixty-three-month minimum sentence to a twenty-four months
seems substantial. Similarly, lowering Mrs. McDonnell's forty-
one-month minimum sentence to twelve months seems significant
as well.
Though a significant departure from the Guidelines may be
justifiable, the departure may merely suggest a judicial prefer-
ence for wide discretion in sentencing. Judge Spencer clearly did
not believe the McDonnells engaged in behavior that warranted
the sentence calculated under the Guidelines, but it is unclear
262. See Indictment, supra note 2, 22.
263. For those who believe that this case is more akin to illegal gratuities than bribery,
the Guidelines do not provide much comfort. Illegal gratuities are punished relatively sim-
ilar to bribery. Compare Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012), and U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2CI.1 (U.S. SENTENCING CGOMM'N 2014), with 18 U.S.C. § 201
(2012), and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014). However, the illegal gratuities crime has a maximum penalty of two years. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014); see id. ch. 5,
pt. A. If the McDonnells are thought to have essentially engaged in an illegal gratuities
scheme-accepting payments for official acts that Governor McDonnell would have under-
taken without the gratuities-a two-year sentence with all counts running concurrently
could match Governor McDonnell's sentence precisely. Id. Of course, the convictions in
this case suggest that the scheme involved actual bribery.
264. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING




why. The McDonnells were convicted of public corruption crimes
which involved a significant amount of money and goods. Alt-
hough they may be good people, the Guidelines suggest a signifi-
cant sentence for this style of crime. Many factors that would
trigger a lesser sentence, other than the judge's sense of fairness,
are already considered by the Guidelines.66 Of course, the Guide-
lines may be deficient in equilibrating sentences, and a judge's
bare sense of justice may be an appropriate basis for a moderate
departure from a guideline sentence. However, it is unclear that
a judge's sense of justice justifies such a substantial departure
from a guideline sentence as arguably occurred in the McDon-
nells' case.
CONCLUSION
The McDonnell case is tragic and sad, but the fundamental
question of whether it involved politics as usual or public corrup-
tion appears to have been resolved. The jury found that Governor
McDonnell traded official acts for significant gifts and goods, and
the Fourth Circuit has somewhat clarified the definition of "offi-
cial acts" for now.
However, two interesting questions remain open. First, how
much evidence would have been required to sustain Mrs. McDon-
nell's conviction for obstructing an official proceeding? Second,
are Judge Spencer's departures from the guideline sentences
just? That question may be unanswerable. Where one stands on
the issue may depend largely on what crimes one believes the
McDonnells committed, as opposed to the crimes for which they
were actually convicted.
266. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014); Green, supra note 246 (indicating that Governor McDonnell "receive[d]
credit" for his military service).
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